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This chapter compares Indigenous territorial rights in the United States, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand thematically under four headings: the sources, nature and content, proof, 
and protection of Indigenous rights. The first two are closely linked, as the nature and 
content of Indigenous rights are determined largely by their sources. Likewise, proof of 
Indigenous rights also depends on their sources. The protection they are accorded in any 
particular nation-state depends mainly on its constitution, with recent additional 
protection emerging in international law. 
 
The major premise of the chapter is that Indigenous rights are territorial, encompassing 
real property rights and governmental authority over a geographical space. The chapter 
examines these rights primarily from the perspectives of the dominant state legal systems 
in the four jurisdictions discussed. The author acknowledges nonetheless that Indigenous 
peoples have their own legal orders that govern these rights internally within their own 
territories. However, the focus of the analysis is on the external dimensions of Indigenous 
territorial rights, that is, the sources, nature, etc. of those rights vis-à-vis the rest of society, 
especially the settler governments. 
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Abstract:  This chapter compares Indigenous territorial rights in the United States, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand thematically under four headings: the sources, nature 
and content, proof, and protection of Indigenous rights. The first two are closely linked, 
as the nature and content of Indigenous rights are determined largely by their sources. 
Likewise, proof of Indigenous rights also depends on their sources. The protection they 
are accorded in any particular nation-state depends mainly on its constitution, with recent 
additional protection emerging in international law. 
The major premise of the chapter is that Indigenous rights are territorial, 
encompassing real property rights and governmental authority over a geographical space. 
The chapter examines these rights primarily from the perspectives of the dominant state 
legal systems in the four jurisdictions discussed. The author acknowledges nonetheless 
that Indigenous peoples have their own legal orders that govern these rights internally 
within their own territories. However, the focus of the analysis is on the external 
dimensions of Indigenous territorial rights, that is, the sources, nature, etc. of those rights 
vis-à-vis the rest of society, especially the settler governments. 
 
This chapter is entitled ‘Indigenous territorial rights’ rather than ‘Indigenous land rights’ 
because the rights of Indigenous peoples are rights to territory that encompass, but are not 
limited to, land rights (McNeil, 2013b).1 The term ‘land rights’ generally means property 
rights, whereas I use the term ‘territorial rights’ to include jurisdiction (governmental 
                                                 
1 In this chapter, the terms ‘Indigenous’ and ‘Aboriginal’ are used synonymously, 
depending on context. While I prefer ‘Indigenous’, ‘Aboriginal’ is unavoidable when 
discussing Canada, as s35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982, c11 (UK), recognizes and affirms “the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada.” In the United States, the term ‘Indian’ is still common, 
and so will be used in this chapter in appropriate contexts. 
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authority) over a geographical area as well as property rights to lands therein. In the 
federal nation-states of Australia, Canada and the United States – the countries, along 
with New Zealand, discussed in this chapter – the states and provinces exercise 
jurisdiction over their territories and have property rights in some lands. The 
jurisdictional dimension of their territorial rights empowers them to enact and administer 
laws governing, not just their own property, but the property of individuals and 
corporations within the state or province. 
 Similarly, I regard the territorial rights of Indigenous peoples as including both 
jurisdiction over and property in the lands within their territories. As discussed below, the 
jurisdictional aspect of these peoples’ rights has been legally acknowledged in the United 
States since at least the 1830s, recognized in the Māori version of the Treaty of Waitangi 
in New Zealand in 1840, tentatively accepted in Canada during the last 20 years or so, but 
denied in Australia ever since British colonization began in 1788. 
 In this chapter, Indigenous territorial rights are discussed primarily from the 
perspective of the dominant legal systems of these four nation-states. I nonetheless 
acknowledge that Indigenous peoples have their own legal orders that can and should be 
used to determine the nature and content of their rights (Napoleon, 2009; Borrows, 2010; 
Jones, 2013). Where land rights are concerned, these legal orders are internal to the 
Indigenous people in question. Using these legal orders to determine their land rights vis-
à-vis the governments that have imposed their authority on them is problematic, as the 
example of Australia, discussed below, demonstrates. A territorial approach can mean 
that Indigenous rights are determined externally by what some have called intersocietal 
law (Slattery, 1991; Walters, 2006),  conceived of as the law that developed and is 
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continuing to develop to govern the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
governments within internationally recognized nation-states.2 At the jurisdictional level, 
relations between these governments, and their authority and rights vis-à-vis one another, 
should be determined, not by the internal law of either government, but by this 
intersocietal law. The situation is similar to the relationship of the national government 
with state or provincial governments in federal systems: it is governed not by federal or 
state/provincial law, but by the higher law of the constitution to which both are subject. 
 This chapter compares Indigenous territorial rights in the United States, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand thematically under four headings: the sources, nature and 
content, proof, and protection of Indigenous rights. The first two are closely linked, as the 
nature and content of Indigenous rights are determined largely by their sources. Likewise, 
proof of Indigenous rights also depends on their sources. The protection they are 
                                                 
2 International recognition does not mean nation-state sovereignty over Indigenous 
peoples is legitimate; it only means that nation-states in the international community 
acknowledge this sovereignty in their system of international law. This sovereignty may 
not be recognized in Indigenous legal systems. The legitimacy of nation-state sovereignty 
cannot be assessed solely from the perspective of international law, as Indigenous 
peoples (prior to the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) had 
no part in creating that law and have generally not consented to its application to their 
territories (McNeil, 2013a). 
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accorded in any particular nation-state depends mainly on its constitution, with recent 
additional protection emerging in international law.3 
 
1. Sources of Indigenous territorial rights 
 
The highest courts in the nation-states considered here have identified four legal orders as 
potentially relevant for determining the sources of Indigenous territorial rights: (1) 
natural law, especially as expressed in the law of nations; (2) the common law; (3) 
Indigenous law; and (4) positive law enactments such as proclamations and statutes. The 
United States Supreme Court has relied mainly on the first of these. In Canada the 
Supreme Court has focused more on the common law and Indigenous law. The highest 
courts in Australia and New Zealand have relied on Indigenous law, but not in the same 
way as the Canadian Supreme Court. Statutes have been positive sources of limited 
Indigenous land rights in all four nation-states, examples being the Aboriginal Land 
Rights (Northern Territory) Act4 in Australia and the Metis Settlements Act5 in Canada. 
As statutory land rights are generally local and defined by positive enactment rather than 
broader legal principles, they will not be discussed here. 
                                                 
3 I will not discuss Indigenous peoples’ rights in international law, as this is dealt with in 
Federico Lenzerini’s chapter. 
4 Cth, No 191 of 1976. 
5 RSA 2000, cM-14. 
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 Looking first at American law, Chief Justice Marshall delivered his seminal 
decision on the matter in 1823 in Johnson v M’Intosh,6 a case involving the validity of 
alienation of Indian lands to a private purchaser prior to the American Revolution. 
Marshall regarded the Indian tribes as independent nations with complete sovereignty and 
ownership of lands in the territories occupied by them prior to European colonization. He 
then created the doctrine of discovery, a supposed principle of the law of nations that he 
thought had been agreed upon by all the colonizing European powers to avoid disputes 
among themselves over their territorial claims in North America.7 Discovery, he said, 
‘gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, 
against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by 
possession.’8 On the impact of discovery on the Indian nations, Marshall observed: 
 
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as 
just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; 
but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily 
                                                 
6 21 US (8 Wheat) 543 (1823) [Johnson]. For background and critical analysis, see 
Robertson, 2005. 
7 Marshall was undoubtedly wrong about this, as subsequent research has revealed no 
such agreement. On the contrary, the European powers each relied on justifications for 
colonial acquisitions that served their own interests and disparaged justifications that 
supported their rivals’ claims. See Lindley, 1926; Goebel, 1927: 47-119; Seed, 1995; 
Slattery, 2005. 
8Johnson, above n6, 573. 
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diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to 
whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that 
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.9 
 
This passage might be interpreted as meaning that discovery itself reduced Indian 
territorial rights, but that reading was disavowed by Marshall himself in 1832 in 
Worcester v Georgia (Secher, 2014: 51-58).10 There he said that discovery 
 
… was an exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition among 
those who had agreed to it; not one which could annul the previous rights of those 
who had not agreed to it. It regulated the right given by discovery among the 
European discoverers, but could not affect the rights of those already in 
possession, either as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a 
discovery made before the memory of man.11 
 
In other words the doctrine of discovery applied only among the European powers that 
had agreed to it, not to the Indian nations that had not.12 For European powers to acquire 
                                                 
9 Ibid, 574. For critiques, see Deloria, 1985: 85-111; Williams, 1990: 308-17; Wilkins 
and Lomawaima, 2001: 19-63; Miller et al, 2010. 
10 31 US (6 Pet) 515 (1832) [Worcester]. 
11 Ibid, 544. 
12 This is consistent with the international law principle that treaties bind only the parties: 
see Direct United States Cable Company v Anglo-American Telegraph Company (1877), 
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sovereignty over Indian territories and a right of preemption of their lands, something 
more was required: an actual taking of possession, which could occur as a result of either 
treaty or conquest (McNeil, 2000a: 11-14).13 
European sovereignty was thus acquired by a combination of a supposed principle 
of the law of nations and the actual taking of possession by the colonizing nation-state. 
This acquisition reduced the complete independence of the Indian nations, leading 
Marshall CJ to conclude that, once included within the territorial limits of the United 
States, they were ‘domestic dependent nations’.14 He nonetheless held that they retained 
their internal independence and lands within the territories that had not been ceded by 
them or taken by force.15 Marshall’s pronouncements on this matter remain the 
fundamental American law on Indian territorial rights,16 subject to the so-called plenary 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 App Cas 394 (PC) at 421; Clipperton Island Case, (1932) 26 AJIL 390 at 394; McNair, 
1965: 412; Brownlie, 2003: 598-600. 
13 In Worcester, above n10, 547, 549, Marshall played down conquest, finding instead 
that the British and American practice was to enter into treaties. Compare Johnson, above 
n6, 589-92. 
14 Cherokee Nation v Georgia, 30 US (5 Pet) 1 at 17 (1831) [Cherokee Nation]. 
15 Ibid; Johnson, above n6, 593; Worcester, above n10, especially 555-61. 
16 United State v Mazurie, 419 US 544 at 557 (1975); United States v Wheeler, 435 US 
313 at 322-23 (1978) [Wheeler]; Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 436 US 49 (1978); 
United States v Lara, 541 US 193 (2004) [Lara]. See Newton, 2012: §4.01[1][a]. 
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power of Congress to reduce or even take away these rights17 and to judicially 
constructed limitations on Indian nations’ authority over nonmembers in their 
territories.18 
 Indian territorial rights in what is now the United States therefore predated 
European acquisition of sovereignty and continued after the creation of the American 
Republic, in the reduced form described by Chief Justice Marshall (Newton, 2012: 
§15.04[2]). But what exactly is the source of these rights? While acknowledging that the 
Indian nations have their own internal systems of law,19 Marshall did not seem to regard 
those legal systems as the source of their territorial rights. Instead, he viewed natural law, 
which prior to the rise of legal positivism in the 19th century was the generally accepted 
basis for the law of nations, as the source. In Worcester v Georgia, he said that the 
‘Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political 
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the 
soil, from time immemorial’.20 These rights include not just property rights to land, but 
                                                 
17 See United States v Kagama, 118 US 375 (1986); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 US 553 
(1903). For critiques, see Wilkins and Lomawaima, 2001: 98-116; Clinton, 2002. 
18 See Oliphant v Squamish Indian Tribe, 435 US 191 (1978); Montana v United States, 
450 US 544 (1981); Strate v A-1 Contractors, 520 US 438 (1997); Nevada v Hicks, 533 
US 353 (2001); Plains Commercial Bank v Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 US 316 
(2008). For critiques, see Duthu, 1994; Frickey, 1999; LaVelle, 2006; Levy, 2013. 
19 See Johnson, above n6, 593; Worcester, above n10, 542-43. 
20 Worcester, above n10, 559 (emphasis added). See also 560, where he referred to the 
‘original right, possessed by the occupants of every country’, and quotation at n11 above. 
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governance rights over territory.21 In American law, the source of Indian territorial rights 
therefore appears to be possession and the effect given to it by natural law.22 
In Canada the source of Indigenous territorial rights is also possession, though the 
Supreme Court has not yet pronounced on whether this possession entails jurisdiction as 
well as property rights. The leading case is Delgamuukw v British Columbia,23 decided in 
1997. It involved a claim to Aboriginal title and self-government by the Gitksan and 
Wet’suwet’en Nations in central British Columbia. The Supreme Court did not rule on 
the self-government issue, nor did it decide whether Aboriginal title had been proven, as 
problems with the pleadings and mistreatment of oral history evidence by the trial judge 
necessitated a new trial (the case has not been retried). Chief Justice Lamer nonetheless 
wrote a lengthy judgment on the source, content, proof and constitutional protection of 
Aboriginal title. 
Regarding the source, Lamer CJ stated that, although it was once thought that 
Aboriginal title is sourced in the Royal Proclamation of 1763,24 it is now clear that it 
                                                 
21 Ibid, 559, 561. 
22 Likewise in international law, possession through effective control, including physical 
presence and exercise of jurisdiction, is the source of title to previously unoccupied and 
unclaimed territory. See Island of Palmas Case, (1928) 2 RIAA 829; Legal Status of 
Eastern Greenland Case, (1933) 2 PCIJ, Series A/B, No 43; Minquiers and Ecrehos 
Case, 1953 ICJR 47. 
23 [1997] 3 SCR 1010 [Delgamuukw]. 
24 Reproduced in RSC 1985, App II, No 1. Among other things, this Proclamation, issued 
by George III, provided protections for Indian lands and established a process for 
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… arises from the prior occupation of Canada by aboriginal peoples. That prior 
occupation, however, is relevant in two different ways, both of which illustrate 
the sui generis nature of aboriginal title. The first is the physical fact of 
occupation, which derives from the common law principle that occupation is 
proof of possession in law…. What makes aboriginal title sui generis is that it 
arises from possession before the assertion of British sovereignty, whereas normal 
estates, like fee simple, arise afterward…. This idea has been further developed in 
Roberts v. Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322, where this Court unanimously held at p. 
340 that ‘aboriginal title pre-dated colonization by the British and survived British 
claims of sovereignty’…. What this suggests is a second source for aboriginal title 
– the relationship between common law and pre-existing systems of aboriginal 
law.25 
 
While this passage suggests that common law possession and Aboriginal law are 
two distinct sources, later in his judgment Lamer seems to have combined them: 
Aboriginal title, he said, arises from exclusive occupation of land immediately prior to 
the British Crown’s assertion of sovereignty. This occupation can be shown by evidence 
of physical presence and use, and by reliance on Aboriginal law: ‘if, at the time of 
sovereignty, an aboriginal society had laws in relation to land, those laws would be 
                                                                                                                                                 
surrendering them to the Crown. See St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v The 
Queen, (1888) 14 App Cas 46 (PC). 
25 Delgamuukw, above n23, para 114. 
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relevant to establishing the occupation of lands which are the subject of a claim for 
aboriginal title. Relevant laws might include, but are not limited to, a land tenure system 
or laws governing land use.’26 Use of Aboriginal law as evidence of occupation has been 
recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia,27 
discussed below in relation to proof. 
 Indigenous land rights in Canada are not limited to Aboriginal title. The Supreme 
Court has upheld resource use rights, such as the right to hunt, fish, or harvest timber for 
domestic purposes on specific lands,28 that arise, not from exclusive occupation of land, 
but from practices, customs and traditions that were integral to distinctive Indigenous 
cultures at the time of contact with Europeans29 or, in the case of the Métis, effective 
                                                 
26 Ibid, para 148. It is doubtful that Lamer intended to dismiss the possibility of 
Aboriginal law being a distinct source in addition to evidence of occupation. The passage 
from Roberts v Canada that he quoted with approval (text at n25 above) apparently refers 
to situations where Aboriginal peoples had land rights under their own laws that 
continued after Crown sovereignty. See McNeil and Yarrow, 2007: 204-11. 
27 [2014] 2 SCR 257 [Tsilhqot’in Nation]. 
28 See R v Adams, [1996] 3 SCR 101; R v Powley, [2003] 2 SCR 207 [Powley]; R v 
Sappier; R v Gray, [2006] 2 SCR 686 [Sapper/Gray]. 
29 R v Van der Peet [1996] 2 SCR 507 [Van der Peet]. For critiques, see Borrows, 1997; 
Barsh and Henderson, 1997; Cheng, 1997. 
 12
European control.30 Relevant customs and traditions can include, but are not limited to, 
Aboriginal laws.31 
In Australia Indigenous law has been used more directly as the basis for 
Indigenous land rights. In Mabo v Queensland [No 2],32 decided in 1992, the High Court 
for the first time acknowledged the existence of Native title (the Australian term for 
Indigenous land rights), thereby reversing two centuries of denial (Russell, 2005; Keon-
Cohen, 2011; Secher, 2014). The Court issued an order declaring that the Meriam people 
of the Murray Islands in the Torres Strait off Queensland’s Cape York ‘are entitled as 
against the whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands of the 
Murray Islands.’33 On Native title’s source, Justice Brennan, delivering the principal 
judgment, stated that it ‘has its origin in and is given its content by the traditional laws 
acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a 
territory.’34 The Court thus adopted a principle of British colonial and international law, 
commonly called the doctrine of continuity, whereby the property rights of local peoples 
under their own legal systems are presumed to have continued and become enforceable in 
                                                 
30 Powley, above n28. The Métis, who originated as a distinct people mainly from 
intermarriage of Indigenous women and European fur-traders, are one of the three 
Aboriginal peoples, along with Indians and Inuit, whose Aboriginal rights are recognized 
and affirmed by s35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, above n1. See Chartrand, 2002. 
31 See Sappier/Gray, above n28, para 45. 
32 (1992) 175 CLR 1 [Mabo]. 
33 Ibid, Court Order, 217. 
34 Ibid, 58. 
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common law courts after Crown acquisition of sovereignty over a colonial territory 
(O’Connell, 1967: I, 237-50; Walters, 1999; Barsh, 2004.). 
The justices could not, however, have based the communal title of the Meriam 
people on Meriam law, as Justice Moynihan, the judge who had made the factual findings 
upon which the High Court’s decision was based, had ‘found that there was apparently no 
concept of public or general community ownership among the people of Murray Island, 
all the land on Murray Island being regarded as belonging to individuals or groups.’35 
According to Brennan J, the communal title was based instead on possession, giving rise 
to a proprietary interest in the Meriam people as a whole that, along with the interests 
based on Meriam law, continued after Crown assertion of sovereignty: 
 
If it be necessary to categorize an interest in land as proprietary in order that it 
survive a change in sovereignty, the interest possessed by a community that is in 
exclusive possession of land falls into that category. Whether or not land is owned 
by individual members of a community, a community which asserts and asserts 
effectively that none but its members has any right to occupy or use the land has 
an interest in the land that must be proprietary in nature: there is no other 
proprietor.36 
 
                                                 
35 Ibid, 22. 
36 Ibid, 51. 
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 Unfortunately, this aspect of Brennan J’s decision was ignored by the Australian 
Parliament when it enacted the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), a complex statutory regime 
designed in part to give effect to the Mabo decision. Section 223(1) of the Act contains a 
definition of Native title that reflects only its Indigenous law source, disregarding 
Brennan’s possessory explanation for the Meriam people’s communal title that must have 
been the basis for the Court’s order quoted above (McNeil, 2012a): 
 
223 (1)  The expression native title or native title rights and interests means the 
communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or 
Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters, where: 
       (a)  the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws 
acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples or 
Torres Strait Islanders; and 
       (b)  the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and 
customs, have a connection with the land or waters; and 
       (c)  the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia. 
 
The High Court has since relied on this statutory definition and required evidence of 
Indigenous laws and customs at the time of Crown acquisition of sovereignty to establish 
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land rights, as well as requiring proof that the laws and customs have been substantially 
maintained up to the present day.37 
In New Zealand Māori territorial rights were acknowledged at the outset of formal 
British colonization by the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi. Continuing Māori territorial 
jurisdiction is provided for in the Māori version, though not explicitly in the English 
version (Ruru, 2009: 114). Land rights are guaranteed in both. In English, the Māori have 
‘the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests 
Fisheries and other properties.’38 In the 1847 decision of the New Zealand Supreme 
Court in The Queen v Symonds,39 Justice Chapman observed that ‘in solemnly 
guaranteeing the Native title … the Treaty of Waitangi, confirmed by the Charter of the 
Colony, does not assert either in doctrine or in practice any thing new and unsettled.’40 
The Privy Council approved of this decision in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker,41 rejec
Chief Justice Prendergast’s opinion in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington
ting 
                                                
42 that ‘there is 
 
37 See Fejo v Northern Territory, (1998) 195 CLR 128; Commonwealth v Yarmirr, (2001) 
208 CLR 1; Western Australia v Ward, (2002) 213 CLR 1 [Ward]; Members of the Yorta 
Yorta Community v Victoria, (2002) 214 CLR 422 [Yorta Yorta]. For critical analysis, see 
Young, 2008; Strelein, 2009. 
38 Art 2. The Treaty is reproduced in the Treaty of Waitangi Act, NZS 1975, No 114, First 
Schedule. See McHugh, 1991; Orange, 2004; Belgrave et al, 2005. 
39 [1840-1932] NZPCC 387. 
40 Ibid, 390. 
41 [1901] AC 561 [Nireaha Tamaki]. 
42 (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72. 
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no customary law of the Maoris of which the Courts of Law can take cognizance’.43 The 
Privy Council said instead that the regime put in place by statute to give effect to Māor
title ‘plainly assumes the existence of a tenure of land under custom and usage which is 




                                                
44 The New Zealand Cou
of Appeal recently affirmed in Attorney-General v Ngati Apa45 that Māori land rights are 
sourced in Māori custom and usage, or tikanga Māori (Ruru, 2009
 The doctrine of continuity of pre-existing Indigenous land rights has thus been 
applied less rigidly in New Zealand than in Australia (Young, 2008: 167-200). The 
source of Māori land rights is not just traditional laws and customs, but also practice and 
usage, as is the case for Aboriginal rights apart from title in Canada (McNeil, 2007a: 87-
89). This approach avoids the problem faced by Indigenous claimants in Australia of 
having to prove that they had a normative system prior to Crown sovereignty that 
provided them with ‘rights’ recognizable as such by Australian judges.46 
 
2. The nature and content of Indigenous territorial rights 
 
As mentioned earlier, the nature and content of Indigenous territorial rights are 
determined largely by their source. Where the source is possession and application of 
 
43 Nireaha Tamaki, above n41, 577. See Secher, 2014: 59-75. 
44 Nireaha Tamaki, above n41, 577. 
45 [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA) [Ngati Apa]. 
46 See Yorta Yorta, above n37. For critiques, see McNeil, 2001b; Young, 2008. 
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natural or common law, as in the United States and Canada, the result is different from 
Australia and New Zealand where Indigenous law is relied upon. 
 In the United States, we have seen that the Indian nations’ complete independence 
and ownership of lands prior to European colonization flowed from their possession of 
territories ‘either as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a discovery made 
before the memory of man.’47  After colonization and inclusion within the United States, 
they retained both their jurisdiction over and land rights within the territories held by 
them as ‘domestic dependent nations’.48 The jurisdictional dimension of their territorial 
rights amounts to residual sovereignty: the Indian nations have inherent governmental 
authority to the extent that it has not been diminished by colonization and inclusion 
within the United States, treaties, Acts of Congress, and judicial decisions (Newton, 
2012: § 4.01). Their land rights are all-encompassing, amounting to a collective right to 
exclusive possession, use and enjoyment of their lands, including rights to standing 
timber and subsurface rights to minerals.49 However, while the Indian nations can make 
laws providing for the creation of individual or other property rights within their 
                                                 
47 Worcester, above n10, 544. 
48 Cherokee Nation, above n14; Worcester, above n10. See Norgren, 1996. 
49 See United States v Shoshone Tribe, 304 US 111 at 115-18 (1938); United States v 
Klamath and Moadoc Tribes, 304 US 119 at 122-23 (1938); Otoe and Missouria Tribe v 
United States, 131 F Supp 265 at 290-91 (1955), cert denied 350 US 848 (1955); United 
States v Northern Paiute Nation, 393 F 2d 786 at 796 (1968); United States ex rel Chunie 
v Ringrose, 788 F 2d 638 at 642 (1986). 
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territories, they can only alienate their collectively-held lands so as to remove them from 
their territory and jurisdiction by surrendering them to the United States.50 
 In Canada, the Supreme Court has held that the Aboriginal title arising from 
exclusive occupation at the time of the British Crown’s assertion of sovereignty is a sui 
generis property right.51 As in the United States, Aboriginal title is a collective interest 
that is inalienable other than by surrender to the Crown.52 It is also a complete beneficial 
interest, including timber, minerals, oil and gas.53 As held by Lamer CJ in Delgamuukw, 
it ‘encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that 
title for a variety of purposes, which need not be aspects of those aboriginal practices, 
customs and traditions which are integral to distinctive aboriginal cultures’.54 It also 
includes authority to manage the land,55 though unlike in the United States the Supreme 
Court has not clarified whether this authority is governmental in nature. However, in 
                                                 
50 Johnson, above n6. However, from 1887 to 1934, the General Allotment Act, 24 US 
Stat 388, permitted creation of individual landholdings and distribution of ‘surplus’ 
Indian lands, resulting in loss of about two-thirds of tribal lands: see Otis, 1973; Prucha, 
1976: 227-64. 
51 Delgamuukw, above n23, paras 109-15. 
52 Ibid, paras 113, 115. Although inalienability is usually justified as a necessary 
protection against exploitation, a better explanation may be that private persons cannot 
acquire a title that has jurisdictional dimensions: see McNeil, 2002. 
53 Delgamuukw, above n23, paras 116-24; Tsilhqot’in Nation, above n27, paras 67, 116. 
54 Delgamuukw, above n23, para 117. 
55 Ibid, para 115; Tsilhqot’in Nation, above n27, para 73. 
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Campbell v British Columbia,56 a trial court decision that was not appealed, Justice 
Williamson held that the decision-making authority that Aboriginal nations have over 
their lands must be governmental in nature, as a community needs a political structure to 
make collective decisions (McNeil, 2007b: 139-43).57 
 Unlike in the United States, Aboriginal title in Canada is subject to an inherent 
limit. In Delgamuukw, Lamer CJ decided that ‘lands subject to aboriginal title cannot be 
put to such uses as may be irreconcilable with the nature of the occupation of that land 
and the relationship that the particular group has had with the land which together have 
given rise to aboriginal title in the first place.’58 This judicially-created limit is designed 
to preserve the land for the benefit of future generations. Lamer gave this example of its 
application: ‘if occupation is established with reference to the use of the land as a hunting 
ground, then the group that successfully claims aboriginal title to that land may not use it 
in such a fashion as to destroy its value for such a use (e.g., by strip mining it).’59 In her 
                                                 
56 [2000] 4 CNLR 1, paras 137-38 (BCSC) [Campbell]. 
57 In House of Sga’nisim v Canada (Attorney General), [2012] 2 CNLR 82 (BCSC), 
Smith J followed Campbell out of comity, but also held that the Nisga’a Final 
Agreement, 1998, the validity of which was partially challenged in these cases, could be 
upheld as delegated governmental authority. Smith’s decision was upheld on the latter 
basis, without deciding the inherent right issue: [2013] 2 CNLR 226 (BCCA). 
58 Delgamuukw, above n23, para 128. For critical commentary, see McNeil, 2001a: 116-
22. 
59 Delgamuukw, above n23, para 128. He also drew an analogy to equitable waste: ibid, 
para 130. 
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unanimous judgment in Tsilhqot’in Nation, Chief Justice McLachlin clarified that, 
because Aboriginal title is a collective interest held for present and future generations, it 
cannot be alienated, encumbered, used or developed so as to substantially deprive 
succeeding generations of the enjoyment and benefit of it.60 Her emphasis was more on 
sustainable development than on traditional uses. Moreover, she held that the inherent 
limit also applies to non-Aboriginal governments: as ‘Aboriginal title is a group interest 
that inheres in present and future generations[,] …  incursions on Aboriginal title cannot 
be justified if they would substantially deprive future generations of the benefit of the 
land.’61 
 While Aboriginal title in Canada is ‘a right to the land itself’ that is certainly a 
property right,62 it is not clear whether resource use rights such as hunting and fishing 
rights that do not depend on title are proprietary.63 They could be analogized with profits-
à-prendre, though like Aboriginal title they have been described as sui generis by the 
Supreme Court.64 The content of these resource use rights is determined by practices, 
                                                 
60 Tsilhqot’in Nation, above n27, para 74, 
61 Ibid, para 86. 
62 Delgamuukw, above n23, para 138 
63 See R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 [Sparrow], para 68: ‘Fishing rights are not 
traditional property rights. They are rights held by a collective and are in keeping with the 
culture and existence of that group. Courts must be careful, then, to avoid the application 
of traditional common law concepts of property as they develop their understanding of  
… the “sui generis” nature of aboriginal rights.’ 
64 Ibid. 
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customs and traditions that were integral to the distinctive culture of the group in question 
at the time of contact with Europeans or, for the Métis, effective European control.65  In 
Sappier/Gray,66 for example, the Court held that pre-contact practices, customs and 
traditions of the Maliseet and Mi’kmaq peoples in New Brunswick gave them an 
Aboriginal right to harvest wood on Crown land for domestic purposes, such as 
constructing houses and making furniture for themselves. In R v Gladstone,67 the Court 
decided that the Heiltsuk people in British Columbia, based on their pre-contact practices, 
have a right to collect herring spawn on kelp and sell it in commercial quantities. 
 In Australia, reliance on the doctrine of continuity and use of Indigenous law to 
determine the content of Native title have not produced very positive outcomes for 
Indigenous peoples (McNeil, 2001b; Young, 2008; Strelein, 2009). After the Mabo 
decision in 1992, the High Court has regarded Native title as a divisible bundle of rights, 
each of which must originate in Indigenous laws and customs existing at the time of 
British acquisition of sovereignty and continuing substantially uninterrupted to the 
present day.68 Australian law post-Mabo has thus not made the distinction found in 
                                                 
65 Van der Peet, above n29; Powley, above n28. 
66 Above n28. 
67 [1996] 2 SCR 723. 
68 See cases in n37 above, especially Ward and Yorta Yorta. For a recent interpretation of 
Ward, leading to a holding that the Pilki People  in Western Australia have a Native title 
right under their traditional laws and customs to access and take resources from the area 
in question for any purpose, including commercial purposes, see Willis v Western 
Australia, [2014] FCA 714.  
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Canadian law between Aboriginal title as an all-encompassing property right and 
resource use rights based on practices, customs and traditions. Instead, a right to hunt 
estuarine crocodiles is as much a Native title right as a right to live on the land.69 
Moreover, the dimensions of any Native title right are determined, not by possession or 
practices as such, but by the definition of the right in the normative system of the 
Indigenous people concerned.70 So even if they were in exclusive possession of land at 
the time of Crown sovereignty, an Indigenous people’s rights extend only to the resources 
to which they had rights under their own legal system.71 They would not have mineral 
rights, for example, if their pre-sovereignty laws and customs did not provide them with 
these rights.72 
  In addition, the High Court has refused to envisage the existence of inherent 
Indigenous rights that are not in relation to lands and resources. Claims to self-
government rights in particular have been firmly rejected.73 Native title rights therefore 
                                                 
69 See Yanner v Eaton, (1999) 166 ALR 258 (HC); Wik Peoples v Queensland, (1996) 
141 ALR 129 (HC). 
70 See Yorta Yorta, above n37. 
71 Compare Mabo, Court Order, above at n33. 
72 See Ward, above n37, especially para 382. 
73 See Walker v New South Wales, (1994) 182 CLR 45; Coe v Commonwealth, (1993) 68 
ALJR 110; Thorpe v Commonwealth [No 3], (1997) 71 ALJR 767; Yorta Yorta, above 
n37. 
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appear to be narrowly proprietary – they are not territorial in the sense of including 
jurisdiction to make new laws after Crown acquisition of sovereignty.74 
 While the doctrine of continuity has also been applied in New Zealand, it has not 
had the negative impact seen in Australia because Māori land rights are based on tikanga 
Māori, encompassing both custom and usage. However, rights not otherwise extinguished 
were mostly converted into common law interests in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries by the Native (now Māori) Land Court, with the result that not much communal 
Māori land remains (Williams, 1999; Ruru, 2009: 117-18). The New Zealand Court of 
Appeal has nonetheless affirmed that Māori land rights based on tikanga Māori can still 
exist, typically as exclusive interests equivalent to fee simple estates, or less commonly 
as more limited interests.75 Where Māori land rights are exclusive they apparently 
include rights to standing timber and mineral resources, a conclusion flowing from
equivalence to fee simple.
 their 
                                                
76 They also include authority to manage the lands in 
accordance with tikanga Māori, authority that the Māori generally claim flows from their 
sovereignty as confirmed by the Treaty of Waitangi (Durie, 2005; Jones, 2013). 
 
3. Proof of Indigenous territorial rights 
 
 
74 See Yorta Yorta, above n37, paras 43-44. 
75 See Ngati Apa, above n45; Young, 2008: 167-200. 
76 See New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General, [1989] 2 NZLR 142 (CA); 
Tainui Maori Trust Board v Attorney-General, [1989] 2 NZLR 513 (CA), at 527-30; 
Young, 2008: 180-82. 
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When Indigenous rights are claimed in court, the onus is on the claimants to prove their 
rights in accordance with the rules and evidentiary standards of the dominant legal 
system (McNeil, 1999). This can be a formidable task, especially because much of the 
evidence consists of oral traditions, going back hundreds of years in some cases 
(Borrows, 2001; Miller, 2011). In Canada, for example, Aboriginal title depends on proof 
of exclusive occupation at the time the British Crown asserted sovereignty, accepted as 
1713 in mainland Nova Scotia and 1846 in British Columbia.77 Acknowledging the 
difficulties of proof, the Supreme Court has directed trial judges to admit oral histories 
despite the hearsay rule and to give them the weight accorded to written documents.78 As 
with other testimony, judges nonetheless retain discretion over the weight given to oral 
histories.79 
 The tests for proof of Indigenous rights vary in each nation-state, depending on 
their source and other factors. The test in the United States is the least onerous, as 
virtually any Indian use of lands can give rise to Indigenous territorial rights (Cohen, 
1947).80 In 1835 Justice Baldwin expressed the Supreme Court’s opinion in Mitchel v 
United States that Indian occupation ‘was considered with reference to their habits and 
modes of life; their hunting-grounds were as much in their actual possession as the 
                                                 
77 R v Marshall; R v Bernard [2005] 2 SCR 220, para 71 [Marshall/Bernard]; 
Delgamuukw, above n23, para 145. 
78 Delgamuukw, above n23, paras 80-87. 
79 Mitchell v MNR, [2001] 1 SCR 911, para 36 [Mitchell]. 
80 Note that proof of occupation is unnecessary where the government has recognized 
Indian title. For an excellent review of case law, see Kaplan, 2003. 
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cleared fields of the whites, and their rights to its exclusive enjoyment in their own way 
and for their own purposes were as much respected’.81 
 The American approach to occupation is clearly territorial. In United States v. 
Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, Justice Douglas observed: 
 
Occupancy necessary to establish aboriginal possession is a question of fact to be 
determined as any other question of fact. If it were established as a fact that the 
lands in question were, or were included in, the ancestral home of the Walapais in 
the sense that they constituted definable territory occupied exclusively by the 
Walapais (as distinguished from lands wandered over by many tribes), then the 
Walapais had ‘Indian title’.82 
 
Tribes regarded as ‘nomadic’ have thus been held to have title to lands regularly used in 
accordance with their ways of life.83 Title also extends to ‘seasonal or hunting areas over 
                                                 
81 34 US (9 Pet) 711 at 746 (1835). 
82 314 US 339 (1941) [Santa Fe Pacific Railroad]. There are numerous examples of this 
territorial approach in Court of Claims’ decisions reviewing rulings on wrongful taking of 
Indian lands made by the Indian Claims Commission, established in 1946 to deal with 
claims against the United States: see Sutton, 1985; Kaplan, 2003. 
83 United States v Kagama, 118 US 375 at 381 (1886); Cramer v United States, 261 US 
219 at 227 (1923); Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v United States, 324 US 335 
 26
which the Indians had control even though those areas were only used intermittently.’84 
In keeping with the territorial approach, exercise of control is as important as actual use. 
In United States v Seminole Indians of Florida, Justice Collins stated that ‘the 
Government leans far too heavily in the direction of equating “occupancy” (or capacity to 
occupy) with actual possession, whereas the key to Indian title lies in evaluating the 
manner of land-use over a period of time. Physical control or dominion over the land is 
the dispositive criterion.’85 
Unlike in Canada, Indian title in the United States does not depend on occupation 
at the time of European or even American assertion of sovereignty. Instead, occupation 
‘for a long time’ is sufficient (Kaplan, 2003: §3c).86 In Confederated Tribes of the Warm 
Springs Reservation of Oregon v United States, Justice Durfee explained that ‘[t]he time 
requirement, as a general rule, cannot be fixed at a specific number of years. It must be 
long enough to have allowed the Indians to transform the area into domestic territory so 
as not to make the Claims Commission Act ‘an engine for creating aboriginal title in a 
                                                                                                                                                 
at 338-40 (1945); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v United States, 120 F Supp 202 at 204 (1954, Ct 
Cl), affirmed 348 US 272 at 285-88 (1955) [Tee-Hit-Ton Indians USSC]. 
84 Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon v United States, 177 
Ct Cl 184 at 194 (1966) [Confederated Tribes]. 
85 180 Ct Cl 375 at 385-86 (1967, emphasis in original) [Seminole Indians]. 
86 Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v United States, 161 Ct Cl 189 at 202 at 
205-7 (1963), cert denied 375 US 921 (1963) [Sac and Fox Tribe]; United States v 
Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F 2d 1383 at 1394 (1975, Ct Cl) [San Ildefonso]. 
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tribe which itself played the role of conqueror but a few years before.”’87 So Indian 
nations could acquire title by peaceful transfer among themselves or by occupying vacant 
lands after American acquisition of sovereignty,88 thus shortening the timeframe for 
occupation and easing the burden of proof.89 
Regarding exclusivity, American courts have held that two or more Indian nations 
can have joint title if they amicably and exclusively occupied the same territory together 
(Kaplan, 2003: §3b).90 In the Delgamuukw case,91 the Supreme Court suggested that this 
is also possible in Canada, though so far no joint title cases have been decided. This may, 
however, be a means for resolving some of the many overlapping land claims in British 
Columbia (McNeil, 2015). 
 The exclusive occupation at Crown sovereignty required in Canada can be 
established by proof of physical presence on and use of land, as well as by evidence of 
Aboriginal law. In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer explained that ‘the source of 
                                                 
87 Confederated Tribes, above n84, 194, quoting Sac and Fox Tribe, above n86, 206. 
88 See Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v United States, 490 F 2d 935 (1974, 
Ct Cl) [Turtle Mountain Band]. 
89 In Seminole Indians, above n85, 58 years were enough. In Alabama-Coushatta Tribe v 
United States, 28 Fed Cl 95 (1993), 30 years sufficed. 
90 See Santa Fe Pacific Railway, above n82; Turtle Mountain Band, above n88, 944; San 
Ildefonso, above n86, 1394-95; Strong v United States, 518 F 2d 556 at 561-62 (1975, Ct 
Cl), cert denied 423 US 1015 (1975); Uintah Ute Indians v United States, 28 Fed Cl 768 
at 785, 787 n 21 (1993). 
91 Above n23, para 158. 
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aboriginal title appears to be grounded both in the common law and in the aboriginal 
perspective on land; the latter includes, but is not limited to, their systems of law. It 
follows that both should be taken into account in establishing the proof of occupancy.’92 
Physical occupation, he continued, ‘may be established in a variety of ways, ranging from 
the construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of fields to regular use of 
definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its resources.’93 
Relevant factors include ‘the group’s size, manner of life, material resources, and 
technological abilities, and the character of the lands claimed.’94 
 Lamer CJ’s approach to title in Delgamuukw appears to be territorial, as an 
Indigenous nation’s land laws would normally apply to the geographical area over which 
the nation exercised jurisdiction. However, when the Supreme Court reconsidered the 
issue of proof of Aboriginal title in Marshall/Bernard,95 Chief Justice McLachlin 
emphasized physical occupation while virtually ignoring Aboriginal law.96 She also 
seems to have adopted a narrower view of the geographical extent of title, requiring proof 
of occupation of specific sites rather than of a larger territory (McNeil, 2006). Following 
this approach the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British 
Columbia, involving a title claim over a large, sparsely populated area in the interior of 
                                                 
92 Ibid, para 147. 
93 Ibid, para 149. 
94 Ibid, quoting Slattery, 1987: 758. 
95 Above n77. 
96 Compare per LeBel and Fish JJ, ibid, concurring in result but disagreeing with 
McLachlin’s approach. 
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the province, held that Aboriginal title is limited to lands occupied as ‘village sites, 
enclosed or cultivated fields’ and ‘definite tracts’ that ‘were the subject of intensive use 
(specific hunting, fishing, gathering, or spiritual sites).’97 The Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed this decision and for the first time in Canada issued a declaration 
of Aboriginal title over the portion of the claim area where the trial judge had found that 
the requisite occupation had been proven. McLachlin CJ said that the Court in 
Marshall/Bernard ‘did not reject a territorial approach, but held only (at para. 72) that 
there must be “proof of sufficiently regular and exclusive use” of the land in question, a 
requirement established in Delgamuukw.’98 Summarizing the correct approach, she stated 
that ‘[o]ccupation sufficient to ground Aboriginal title is not confined to specific sites of 
settlement but extends to tracts of land that were regularly used for hunting, fishing or 
otherwise exploiting resources and over which the group exercised effective control at the 
time of assertion of European sovereignty.’99 Regarding exclusivity, she said it ‘should 
be understood in the sense of intention and capacity to control the land.’100 One way 
control could be demonstrated would be by evidence that permission was required for 
others to enter the land:  ‘The fact that permission was requested and granted or refused
or that treaties were made with other groups, may show intention and capacity to contr
, 
ol 
                                                 
97 [2012] 3 CNLR 333, para 230. 
98 Tsilhqot’in Nation, above n27, para 43. 
99 Ibid, para 50. 
100 Ibid, para 48. 
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the land. Even the lack of challenges to occupancy may support an inference of 
established group's intention and capacity to control.’
an 
                                                
101 
 McLachlin CJ emphasized the need to take ‘a culturally sensitive approach to 
sufficiency of occupation based on the dual perspectives of the Aboriginal group in 
question – its laws, practices, size, technological ability and the character of the land 
claimed – and the common law notion of possession as a basis for title.’102 While it is not 
clear from her judgment how Indigenous laws relate to proof of title, I would argue that 
evidence of the territorial application of these laws should establish the jurisdictional 
dimension of Aboriginal title (McNeil, 2012b: 750-52). 
Regarding the common law notion of possession as a root of title, McLachlin 
adopted the opinion of Cromwell JA (as he then was) in R v Marshall103 and decided that 
the correct standard is that required for general occupancy, not the higher standard for 
adverse possession (McNeil, 1989: 197-98). ‘A general occupant at common law,’ she 
said, ‘is a person asserting possession of land over which no one else has a present 
interest or with respect to which title is uncertain.’104 Like general occupants and unlike 
adverse possessors, at the time of Crown sovereignty Indigenous peoples obviously were 




102 Ibid, para 41. 
103 [2004] 1 CNLR 211, paras 135-38. Justice Cromwell was appointed to the Supreme 
Court after deciding R v Marshall, reversed in Marshall/Bernard, above n77. 
104 Tsilhqot’in Nation, above n27, para 39. 
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As discussed earlier, Canadian law distinguishes Aboriginal title from rights to 
harvest particular resources. The test for proof of the latter was established by the 
Supreme Court in 1996 in Van der Peet.105 Aboriginal claimants must prove that the 
activity they claim a right over was ‘an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral 
to [their] distinctive culture’ at the time of European contact106 or, for the Métis, effective 
European control.107 In Sappier/Gray, Justice Bastarache said that ‘[f]lexibility is 
important when engaging in the Van der Peet analysis because the object is to provide 
cultural security and continuity for the particular aboriginal society.’108 Regarding the 
‘integral to the distinctive culture’ requirement, he elaborated: 
 
What is meant by ‘culture’ is really an inquiry into the pre-contact way of life of a 
particular aboriginal community, including their means of survival, their 
socialization methods, their legal systems, and, potentially, their trading habits. 
The use of the word ‘distinctive’ as a qualifier is meant to incorporate an element 
of aboriginal specificity. However, ‘distinctive’ does not mean ‘distinct’, and the 
notion of aboriginality must not be reduced to ‘racialized stereotypes of 
Aboriginal peoples’.109 
  
                                                 
105 Above n29. 
106 Ibid, para 46. 
107 Powley, above n28. 
108 Sappier/Gray, above n28, para 33. 
109 Ibid, para 45, quoting Borrows and Rotman, 1997: 36. 
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As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court held that the evidence of pre-contact 
practices of the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet peoples established an Aboriginal right to harvest 
wood for domestic uses on Crown lands traditionally used for that purpose. 
 Unlike in Canada and the United States, in Australia proof of exclusive 
occupation is not enough to establish Native title; instead, a connection to the land based 
on traditional laws and customs is required.110 As argued above, I think this requirement 
stems from a misinterpretation of Justice Brennan’s judgment in Mabo and incorporation 
of this misinterpretation into the definition of Native title in section 223(1) of the Native 
Title Act 1993 (McNeil, 2012a). As construed and applied by the High Court, this section 
necessitates proof that claimants have maintained a connection with their land through 
substantially uninterrupted observance of their laws and customs from Crown sovereignty 
to the present.111 Proof of Native title is thus virtually impossible in populated areas 
where connection to land and observance of traditional laws and customs have been 
severely interfered with. As the cause of loss of connection and observance seems to be 
irrelevant,112 apparently even illegal squatting – a common way of taking Indigenous land 
historically – could have caused loss of Native title by severing the necessary connection. 
                                                 
110 Ward, above n37, especially paras 89-93. 
111 Yorta Yorta, above n37. See also De Rose [No 1], (2003) 133 FCR 325 (Full FC); De 
Rose v South Australia [No 2], (2005) 145 FCR 290; Northern Territory v Alyawarr, 
(2005) 145 FCR 442. 
112 Bodney v Bennell, (2008) 167 FCR 84, paras 96-97, relying on Yorta Yorta, above 
n37, paras 89-90. 
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 The High Court’s approach to Native title also necessitates proof of specific laws 
and customs relating to particular uses of lands and resources.113 A general system of 
traditional laws and customs relating to land is not sufficient unless they provide for 
‘rights’ recognizable as such by Australian courts (Young, 2008). So unlike in Canada 
where historical practices alone can generate rights, in Australia practices must have been 
pursuant to laws and customs.114 Moreover, as previously mentioned proof of exclusive 
occupation does not necessarily result in all-inclusive land rights in Australia.115 
 In New Zealand, we have seen that Indigenous land rights are grounded in tikanga 
Māori, including both custom and usage. Māori land rights can thus be established by 
proof of custom or usage in relation to claimed land when Britain asserted sovereignty in 
1840.116 If exclusive occupation is proven, the claimants have title equivalent to an 
inalienable fee simple estate, whereas more limited interests arise from customs or uses 
that did not provide for exclusive occupation.117 Moreover, unlike in Australia, proof of 
continuous observance of tikanga Māori from the time of British assertion of sovereignty 
                                                 
113 See especially Ward, above n37. 
114 See Mason v Tritton, (1994) 34 NSWLR 572 (NSWCA); Derschaw v Sutton, (1996) 
90 A Crim R 9 (Full SCWA); Dillon v Davies, (1998) 156 ALR 142 (SC Tas). For 
critiques, see McNeil, 2001b: 454-58; Young, 2008: 338-42. 
115 Ward, above n37, especially para 382. 
116 Statutes also apply this common law approach: see Kauwaeranga Judgment, Native 
Land Court, 1870, in (1984) 14 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 227; Ngati 
Apa, above n45; Ruru, 2009. 
117 See text at nn 75-76 above. 
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to the present does not appear to be necessary (Young, 2008: 172-75). As in Canada, 
where title has been established as of that time, apparently it is presumed to continue until 
shown to have been extinguished (McNeil, 2004a).  
 
4. Protection of Indigenous territorial rights 
 
In each nation-state considered here, Indigenous rights are legally enforceable. They 
should therefore enjoy at least as much protection against infringement and taking as 
property rights of private persons. Unfortunately, this has not been so in practice and is 
not even the case in law in some instances. As the protections accorded these rights vis-à-
vis governments depend on constitutional law and vary considerably, we need to consider 
each country separately. 
 In the United States, the Supreme Court has held that Indian title could have been 
acquired by the European powers and the United States by conquest (McNeil, 1989: 245 
n4). In fact, during the nineteenth century the United States did engage in numerous 
Indian wars as it expanded westward, resulting in the taking of immense areas of Indian 
territory.118 In situations where the taking occurred after incorporation of these Indian 
territories into the United States, one needs to wonder at the takings’ legality. Chief 
Justice Marshall nonetheless took a pragmatic approach in Johnson v M’Intosh: 
 
                                                 
118 While conquests were often followed by cession by treaty, the reality is that Indian 
nations often had no choice, as acknowledged in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians USSC, above n83, 
289-90. The Indian Claims Commission did provide some redress: see n82 above. 
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However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited 
country into conquest may appear, if the principle has been asserted in the first 
instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under 
it; if the property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes 
the law of the land and cannot be questioned.119 
 
Quite possibly the power of the United States to take Indian lands by conquest 
could be a consequence of the quasi-independent status of the Indian nations (McNeil, 
1989: 245-49). In its controversial 1955 decision in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v United 
States,120 the Supreme Court held that, unless recognized by the United States, Indian 
title is not a property right compensable under the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment.121 
Justice Reed described Indian title as a ‘right of occupancy [that] may be terminated an
such lands fully disposed of by the sovereign itself [the United States] without any leg
enforceable obligation to compensate the Indians.’
d 
ally 
                                                
122 He observed that the Tee-Hit-Ton 
claim ‘was more a claim of sovereignty than of ownership’,123 suggesting that the 
jurisdictional dimensions of Indian title and the political nature of the Indian nations’ 
 
119 Johnson, above n6, 591. 
120 Above n83. 
121 1 US Stat 21, providing, inter alia, that private property shall not be taken for public 
use without just compensation. 
122 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians USSC,above n83, 279. For critiques, see Henderson, 1977; 
Newton, 1980; Bloxham, 1980; McNeil, 2000b. 
123 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians USSC, above n83, 287. 
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relationship with the United States may justify denying them the protection of the 
Constitution (McNeil, 1989: 259-67).124 In any case, numerous Supreme Court decisions 
have held that Indian territorial rights, including both jurisdiction and land rights, are 
subject to the plenary power of Congress and so can be taken away at any time (Kaplan, 
2003: §5).125 However, the states have no such authority, as the Constitution’s Commerce 
Clause gives Congress exclusive jurisdiction over Indian affairs, and the Indian Trade 
and Intercourse Acts126 from the 1790s prohibit state acquisition of Indian lands (Clinton 
and Hotopp, 1979; Shattuck, 1991). 
In Australia, Indigenous land rights apart from statute were not even 
acknowledged until the Mabo decision in 1992,127 where the High Court also decided 
that Native title could be extinguished, not just by legislation, but by the Crown 
appropriating land or granting it to private persons (McNeil, 2004b; Secher, 2014: 147-
                                                 
124 See also Talton v Mayes, 163 US 376 at 384 (1896), holding that, as Indian nations’ 
governmental powers ‘existed prior to the Constitution, they are not operated upon by the 
Fifth Amendment.’ 
125 See Lone Wolf v Hitchcock, 187 US 553 (1903); Wheeler, above n16, 323; Cotton 
Petroleum Corporation v New Mexico, 490 US 163 at 192 (1989); South Dakota v 
Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 US 329 at 343 (1998). For critiques, see Deloria, 1985: 141-60; 
Wilkins and Lomawaima, 2001: 98-116. In Lara, above n16, Thomas J, concurring in 
result, questioned the plenary power doctrine. 
126 Originally 1 US Stat 137 (1790). See County of Oneida v Oneida Indian Nation, 470 
US 226 (1985). 
127 Above n32. 
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96).128 Native title nonetheless enjoys some protection against state laws by the doctrine








ealand, Māori land rights are even more vulnerable, as they enjoy no 
constitutional protection. Unlike in Australia, there is not even the limited protection of 
                                                
129 Consequently, in Mabo v Queensland [No 1]130 the High Court decid
that a Queensland statute131 purporting to extinguish the land rights of the Torr
Islanders was invalid because it was inconsistent with the federal Racial Discrimin
Act 1975 (Cth). Similarly, in Western Australia v The Commonwealth132 the Court 
invalidated a statute attempting to extinguish Native title in Western Australia and 
replace it with more vulnerable statutory rights,133 as that conflicted with the Racia
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). Since 1993 Nativ




128 Ibid, 15, 64-70, 89. See McNeil, 1996, contending that, absent unambiguous statutory 
authority, extinguishment by appropriation or grant violates fundamental common law 
principles. 
129 S109 of the Constitution, Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, 63 & 64 
Vic, c12 (UK), s9. 
130 (1988) 166 CLR 186. 
131 Queensland Coast Islands Declaratory Act, 1985 (Qld), enacted to forestall the 
proceedings that led to Mabo, above n32. See Keon-Cohen, I, 113-20. 
132 (1995) 128 ALR 1. 











                                                
 paramountcy because New Zealand is a unitary nation-state. Parliament can rely
on the common law doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and enact laws that infringe 
and even extinguish Māori rights.134 This in fact happened as recently as 2004 when 
Parliament passed the Foreshore and Seabed Act (since repealed),135 extinguishing any
exclusive Māori rights to the foreshore and seabed and restricting more limited Māor
rights to engage in practices and uses in relation thereto (Charters and Erueti, 2007). 
Protection of Māori rights against legislation is therefore not constitutional but politica
provided to some extent by Māori representation in Parliament.136 
Of the four nation-states, only in Canada are Indigenous rights explicitly protected
by the Constitution. Prior to 1982, the Canadian Parliament had the
ish these rights by clear and plain legislation, but that changed when section 35(1) 
of the Constitution Act, 1982 was enacted, providing that ‘[t]he existing aborigin
treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed’.137 
The Supreme Court has nonetheless held that Aboriginal and treaty rights, including lan
rights, can still be infringed, though not extinguished, by legislation if the infringement 
 
134 For the classic exposition of this doctrine, see Dicey, 1885. 
135 2004 No 93, replaced by the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act, 2011 No 
3, ss 5 and 6 of which repealed the 2004 Act and restored the customary interests 
extinguished by it. 
136 Governed by the Electoral Act of 1993. The number of Māori seats is determined by 
the Māori electoral population. See New Zealand Parliament, Research Paper, 2009. 
137 Above n1. See Van der Peet, above n29, para 28; Mitchell, above n79, para 11. 
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can be justified (McNeil, 2004b).138 Justification involves proof by the Crown of a valid
legislative objective and respect for its fiduciary obligations to the Indigenous people 
concerned. Specifically, the Crown must have consulted with them in good faith to try
reach an agreement, have infringed their rights as little as possible to achieve its 








                                                
139 
Prio
ver whether provincial legislatures had the constitutional authority to infringe 
Aboriginal rights, given that these rights are within the core of exclusive federal 
jurisdiction over ‘Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians’(McNeil, 1998; Wi
1999).141 In that case, the Court held that the provinces do have authority to infringe 
these rights, provided the justification test is met. However, as mentioned earlier, 
infringements ‘cannot be justified if they would substantially deprive future generations 
of the benefit of the land.’142 Also, as compensation must be paid for infringements that 
have an economic impact, provinces should think twice about proceeding with reso
 
138 Sparrow, above n63. 
139 Ibid; Delgamuukw, above23, paras 106-69; Tsilhqot’in Nation, above n27, paras 76-
88. 
140 Above n27. 
141 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vic, c12, s91(24). See Delgamuukw, above n23, paras 
173-81. 
142 Tsilhqot’in Nation, above n27, para 86. 
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development without the consent of the Indigenous people who have a claim to the land 




We have seen that Indigenous land rights have been judicially acknowledged in all four 
nation-states, though belatedly in Australia. They are property rights,143 ranging from 
ownership equivalent to an inalienable fee simple to more limited rights to resources that 
were traditionally used in accordance with Indigenous ways of life. Only in the United 
States, however, have Indigenous rights been explicitly accepted by the Supreme Court as 
territorial, encompassing jurisdiction as well as exclusive land rights, with the downside 
that they are not protected against taking by the United States because they are outside 
the scope of the Constitution and subject to the plenary power of Congress. 
 In Australia, the High Court has been unwilling to attribute any jurisdictional 
authority to the Indigenous peoples, making this a matter of negotiated agreement. In 
New Zealand, debate continues over the impact of the Treaty of Waitangi on Māori 
jurisdiction, resulting in divergent opinions (Belgrave et al, 2005). In Canada, the 
Supreme Court has studiously avoided the issue, preferring that it be dealt with in the 
                                                 
143 Though in the United States they are only property rights for constitutional purposes if 
recognized: see text at nn 120-24 above. 
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political arena.144 This has been happening slowly in modern land claims agreements, 
such as the Nisga’a Final Agreement of 1998,145 but if Justice Williamson was correct in 
the Campbell decision (as I think he was: McNeil, 2007b),146 then these agreements do 
not create self-government rights; rather, they acknowledge and define the existing 
inherent jurisdiction of Indigenous peoples over their territories. Canada is thus moving 
in the direction of the United States, though more in the political arena than in the courts. 
However, without the impetus of court decisions since the recognition of Indigenous 
rights in the Constitution in 1982, this probably would not be happening.
                                                 
144 See Delgamuukw, above n23. In R v Pamajewon, [1996] 2 SCR  821, the one case 
dealing with a self-government claim directly, the Court made it so hard to prove that the 
matter necessarily got forced back to the political arena. 
145 Online: http://www.nnkn.ca/files/u28/nis-eng.pdf. 
146 Campbell, above n56. 
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